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to the Federal Circuit on an Interlocutory Basis 
By Srikanth K. Reddy *
“Sensing the importance of claim construction on the outcome of patent 
cases, parties will likely seek ways to promptly bring the issue before the 
Federal Circuit.  In cases where parties dispute facts . . . once the court 
resolves the meaning of claim terms the parties will seek an immediate 
interlocutory appeal to avoid the possibility of dual trials should the 
Federal Circuit reverse the trial court's claim construction on an appeal 
from a jury verdict . . . a case could be appealed to the Federal Circuit only 
months after the complaint is filed.”1
I. INTRODUCTION 
¶1 The resolution of patent infringement litigation cases requires litigants and the 
district court to execute numerous procedures that are unique to the patent field.  A 
district judge’s process of determining the meaning of the terms that comprise the patent 
claims, recognized in the industry as “claim construction,” is an example of such a 
procedure.   
¶2 A patent’s claims “particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter 
which the applicant regards as his invention.”2  While a patent’s specification and 
background of the invention provide context for the invention, the claims “set the outer 
boundaries of the patentee's exclusive right to prevent others from making, using, or 
selling the invention described by those claims during the life of the patent.”3  Indeed, a 
court’s use of patent claims to define the scope of the invention is a “bedrock principle” 
of patent law.  4
¶3 The purpose of claim construction is to determine, as a matter of law, the meaning 
of words used in the patent claim.5  In construing claim terms, the district courts are 
instructed to give words “their ordinary and customary meaning.”   The court attempts to 6
 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2007, Northwestern University.
1 Elf Atochem N. Am. v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 894 F. Supp. 844, 857 (D. Del. 1995) (forecasting “the 
[i]mpact of Markman on [the] [t]rial of [p]atent [c]ases”).
2 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000). 
3 Elf Atochem N. Am., 894 F. Supp. at 858 (citing In re Vamco Mach. & Tool, Inc., 752 F.2d 1564, 1577 
n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). 
4 Innova/Pure Water v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
5 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 
(1996). 
6 Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
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make this determination in a manner similar to a person having ordinary skill in the art 
(PHOSITA) at the time the invention was made.    7
¶4 In holding that claim construction is not covered by the Seventh Amendment’s 
right to a jury trial, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) concluded in 
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. that “the interpretation and construction of patent 
claims, which define the scope of the patentee’s rights under the patent, is a matter of law 
exclusively for the court.”8  The CAFC’s Markman decision formalized the claim 
construction process.  During this procedure, parties exchange proposed definitions while 
the court attempts to ascertain the meanings of the claim terms that are in dispute.  
Typically, courts allow oral argument in such Markman hearings.  The process 
culminates with the issuance of the court’s order defining the disputed claim terms. 
¶5 In their Markman decisions neither the CAFC nor the Supreme Court opined as to 
when claim construction hearings should occur.  Indeed, the CAFC has explicitly refused 
to provide the district courts with any guidance as to the preferred timing of the claim 
construction process.9  Furthermore, as a result of its Markman decision, the CAFC is 
required to review district court claim construction orders on a de novo basis.  10
¶6 This comment argues that post-Markman jurisprudence has failed to achieve its 
goals of providing greater certainty and uniformity in the process of claim construction.  
Although Markman achieved uniformity across the 94 judicial districts in who determines 
the scope of claims, continued variety in when and how claim construction occurs implies 
that additional changes are needed to combat the still-pervasive evils of forum shopping.  
Because of the failure of post-Markman jurisprudence to bring about certainty or 
uniformity in patent claim construction, this comment posits that claims should be 
construed during the early stages of discovery and that parties should be able to 
immediately appeal the district court’s Markman determination to the CAFC on an 
interlocutory basis.      
¶7 Four procedural changes to the current process of patent claim construction are 
proposed.  First, claim construction should be settled at an early stage in patent litigation, 
specifically, during the initial period of fact discovery.  No changes are proposed to the 
type of intrinsic and extrinsic evidence that the court may consider in the resultant 
Markman hearing, rather the arguments of this comment are couched in a post-Phillips v. 
AWH world.  Second, district court constructions of claims should be immediately 
appealable to the CAFC in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1292, the federal provision 
allowing district courts to certify controlling questions of law directly to the court of 
appeals on an interlocutory basis.  In a hypothetical interlocutory appeal of claim 
construction, the CAFC will continue to evaluate the decision of the district court using a 
de novo standard of review.  Third, after claim construction is settled by either the CAFC 
or the Supreme Court, the case should be remanded to the district court so that formal 
discovery proceedings may continue.  Fourth, in the extremely rare cases where formal 
discovery indicates that the court should have issued a different meaning, the CAFC 
should still review the claim construction after the district court certifies the case for 
 
7 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1332 (2006). 
8 Markman, 52 F.3d at 970-91. 
9 Vivid Techs. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
10 Markman, 52 F.3d at 984 n.13. 
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appeal using a clearly erroneous standard of review.  This reformed procedure maximizes 
judicial efficiency while still giving litigants their “two bites at the apple.” 
¶8 This analysis of patent claim construction includes five parts.  Part II reviews the 
decision of the CAFC and the Supreme court in Markman and evaluates whether the 
goals predicted by Justice Souter have been accomplished.  Part III addresses the current 
law concerning the potential times that a court may consider claim construction as well as 
the status of interlocutory appeals of claim construction before the CAFC.  Part IV lays 
out the proposed solution in greater detail.  Part V discusses the advantages of early 
discovery Markman hearings coupled with interlocutory appeals to the CAFC.  Finally, 
Part VI responds to the myriad of arguments that could be made by others criticizing the 
proposed solution.   
¶9 Few can argue that early discovery claim construction generally favors the party 
who is alleging patent infringement.  To support this argument, one need only look to the 
disproportionate number of infringement cases filed in “rocket docket” districts like the 
District of Delaware and the Northern District of California, where most judges maintain 
pre-determined schedules concerning the timing of discovery and claim construction.11  
Conversely, a system that allows interlocutory appeals of claim construction likely favors 
patent infringement defendants since it extends the duration and costs of patent litigation.  
Thus, the proposed solution provides a carrot to both sides in patent infringement cases.  
The “big winner” in this proposal is the Federal judicial system.  The resultant efficiency 
of the proposal conserves judicial resources while significantly increasing both certainty 
and uniformity in the process of claim construction. 
II. EVALUATION OF MARKMAN AND ITS PROMISES 
¶10 In concluding that claim construction is a matter of law for the judge, the Markman 
Court suggested that judicial claim construction would create intrajurisdictional certainty 
while increasing interjurisdictional uniformity.  Empirical evidence of unusually high 
reversal rates demonstrates that there is very little certainty in the process of claim 
construction.  Although the Markman decision creates interjurisdictional certainty in who 
determines claim construction, scheduling variation across the district courts often 
determines where actions are filed.  One need only examine the unusually high 
distribution of cases in “rocket docket” districts to find evidence that there is little 
certainty across the district courts.  Thus, there is little reason to believe that Markman 
has fulfilled its twin promises of greater certainty and uniformity in patent infringement 
cases. 
A. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc and its Progeny 
¶11 In Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., the CAFC, sitting en banc, addressed 
the issue of whether claim construction is a legal issue, a factual issue, or a variant of 
 
11 See generally Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice Affect 
Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889 (2001); Donald F. Parsons, Jr., et al., Solving the Mystery of Patentees’ 
“Collective Enthusiasm” for Delaware, 7 DEL. L. REV. 145 (2004).   
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both.12  In holding that claim construction is a legal issue entirely within the province of 
the court, the CAFC stated, 
[t]he reason that the courts construe patent claims as a matter of law and 
should not give such task to the jury as a factual matter is straightforward: 
It has long been and continues to be a fundamental principle of American 
law that “the construction of a written evidence is exclusively with the 
court.”13
¶12 Additionally, the court suggested that because a patentee is bound by written 
description and specification requirements “a patent is uniquely suited for having its 
meaning and scope determined entirely by a court as a matter of law.”  14
¶13 In Markman II, the Supreme Court construed the issue slightly differently by 
evaluating whether interpretation of patent claims “is a matter of law reserved entirely for 
the court, or subject to a Seventh Amendment guarantee that a jury will determine the 
meaning of any disputed term of art about which expert testimony is offered.”15  After 
affirming the decision of the CAFC on historical and procedural grounds, Justice Souter, 
writing for a unanimous Court, elucidated two “functional considerations” that support 
the notion of making claim construction a matter of law.16  First, Justice Souter noted that 
judges are better suited to perform claim construction because of their “special training 
and practice.”17  Second, the Court posited that placing claim construction solely in the 
hands of the district courts results in greater intrajurisdictional certainty and 
interjurisdictional uniformity.18  The Court observed that the definition of patent limits is 
integral to the advancement of the American patent system.19  Justice Souter surmised 
that uncertain patent limits at the district court threaten to create “a ‘zone of uncertainty 
which enterprise and experimentation may enter only at the risk of infringement.’”20  He 
further justified his position by analogizing the placement of claim construction solely 
before the judge to Congress’s decision to create the CAFC.21  As such, because judges 
are trained at statutory interpretation, claim construction as a matter of law was thought 
to ensure greater certainty than a system in which the jury decides claim meanings.  22
 
12 Markman, 52 F.3d at 976. 
13 Id. at 978 (citing Levy v. Gadsby, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 180, 186 (1805); Eddy v. Prudence Bonds Corp., 
165 F.2d 157, 163 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, J.); 4 SAMUEL WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 601 (3d 
ed. 1961)). 
14 Id. 
15 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996). 
16 Id. at 388. 
17 Id. (“The construction of written instruments is one of those things that judges often do and are likely to 
do better than jurors unburdened by training in exegesis. Patent construction in particular “is a special 
occupation requiring, like all others, special training and practice. The judge, from his training and 
discipline, is more likely to give a proper interpretation to such instruments than a jury; and he is, therefore, 
more likely to be right.” (quoting Parker v. Hulme, 18 F. Cas. 1138, 1140 (1849))). 
18 Id. at 391.  
19 Id. at 390 (“‘[T]he limits of a patent must be known for the protection of the patentee, the encouragement 
of the inventive genius of others and the assurance that the subject of the patent will be dedicated ultimately 
to the public.’” (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 365, 369 (1938))). 
20 Id. (quoting United Carbon v. Binney & Smith, 317 U.S. 228, 236 (1942)). 
21 Id.  
22 Id. at 391 (“[T]reating interpretive issues as purely legal will promote (though it will not guarantee) 
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¶14  Since holding that claim construction is a matter of law in Markman, the CAFC 
refuses to prescribe any procedures for conducting claim construction.  In Vivid 
Technologies v. American Science & Engineering, the CAFC was asked to adopt a 
uniform rule requiring district courts to order claim constructions no earlier than the end 
of discovery.23  Writing for a unanimous panel, Judge Newman refused to prescribe a 
preferred timing of claim construction, citing the district court’s “broad powers of case 
management, including the power to limit discovery to relevant subject matter and to 
adjust discovery as appropriate to each phase of litigation.”24  Furthermore the court 
declined to adopt a uniform rule, arguing that “the stage at which the claims are construed 
may vary with the issues, their complexity, the potentially dispositive nature of the 
construction, and other considerations of the particular case.”  25
B. Evaluating the Twin Promises of Markman 
¶15 The Court hoped that Markman would create both greater certainty in patent cases 
and enhanced uniformity in the way patent cases are handled across different judicial 
districts.26  Because the rate that district court claim constructions are reversed on appeal 
by the CAFC continues to be very high and since forum shopping continues to place a 
drain on both litigants and the courts, new procedural changes are necessary to return 
some certainty and uniformity to patent litigation. 
1. Intrajurisdictional Certainty 
¶16 Empirical research suggests that Markman has not created greater certainty in claim 
construction.  Numerous legal scholars have commented on the myriad of ways that 
Markman has failed to fulfill its promise of providing greater certainty in the disposition 
of patent infringement cases.27  Merriam-Webster’s dictionary defines “certainty” as “a 
state of being free from doubt.”28  As such, in determining whether Markman has fostered 
greater firmness in the claim construction process, assessors frequently look to the rate 
that the CAFC reverses the claim construction orders of the district courts as a measure of 
whether claim construction is “free from doubt.”   29
 
intrajurisdictional certainty through the application of stare decisis on those questions not yet subject to 
interjurisdictional uniformity under the authority of the single appeals court.”). 
23 Vivid Techs. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
24 Id. at 803-04 (noting the district court’s “broad powers of case management, including the power to limit 
discovery to relevant subject matter and to adjust discovery as appropriate to each phase of litigation.”). 
25 Id. at 803. 
26 Markman, 517 U.S. at 391. 
27 See generally Gretchen Ann Bender, Uncertainty and Unpredictability in Patent Litigation: The Time is 
Ripe for a Consistent Claim Constriction Methodology, 8 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 175, 207 (2001); Christian A. 
Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction Trends, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1075 (2001); Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?, 15 HARV. 
J.L. & TECH. 1 (2001); Gregory J. Wallace, Toward Certainty and Uniformity in Patent Infringement Cases 
After Festo and Markman: A Proposal for a Specialized Patent Trial Court With a Rule of Greater 
Deference, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1383 (2004); Andrew T. Zidel, Patent Claim Construction in the Trial 
Courts: A Study Showing the Need for Clear Guidance from the Federal Circuit, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 
711 (2003). 
28 MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 202 (11th ed. 2003). 
29 See generally Bender, supra note 27; Chu, supra note 27; Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years 
Later: Is Claim Construction More Predictable?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231 (2005); Zidel, supra note 
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¶17 Professor Kimberly Moore of the George Mason University School of Law warns 
of a “sense of fatalism” among district court judges that “no matter how careful” they are 
in construing claims, “there’s a high likelihood that on review the [Federal Circuit] will 
change the construction of the claims.”30  Among the numerous critics suggesting that 
Markman has failed to reach its goals of greater certainty in the process of claim 
construction is Circuit Judge Rader of the CAFC, who, in an oft-cited dissenting opinion, 
observed that  
[w]ith respect to the district court and Court of Federal Claims cases, the 
rate of reversal of claim constructions is 47 out of 126 or 37.3%.  A 
reversal rate in this range reverses more than the work of numerous trial 
courts; it also reverses the benefits of Markman I.  In fact, this reversal 
rate, hovering near 50%, is the worst possible.  Even a rate that was much 
higher would provide greater certainty.  Instead, the current Markman I 
regime means that the trial court's early claim interpretation provides no 
early certainty at all, but only opens the bidding.  The meaning of a claim 
is not certain (and the parties are not prepared to settle) until nearly the last 
step in the process – decision by the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit.31
¶18  In her comprehensive survey reviewing the decisions of the CAFC, Professor 
Moore found that in the 651 separate appeals between 1996 and 2003 in which the 
appellant argued that the district court misconstrued at least one claim term, the CAFC 
held that at least one term was wrongly construed in 37.5% of the cases.32  Furthermore, 
“[i]n the cases in which one or more term was wrongly construed, the erroneous claim 
construction required the Federal Circuit to reverse or vacate the district court’s judgment 
in 29.7% of the cases.”33  Most striking is Professor Moore’s conclusion that the CAFC’s 
rate of reversal of district court claim constructions is increasing with time.  34
¶19 Other researchers have found similar trends in the reversal rates of district court 
claim constructions.  Andrew Zidel determined that, in 2001, the CAFC reversed the 
claim construction decisions of the district courts in 39 of the 94 cases placed before it 
(41.5%).35  Christian Chu found that between January 1, 1998 and April 30, 2000, the 
CAFC overturned 44% of the district court claim constructions placed before it.36  
Gretchen Ann Bender concluded that during the time between when Markman was 
decided and 2000, the CAFC ultimately changed 40% of the claim construction cases 
placed before it.   37
 
27. 
30 Moore, supra note 29, at 232 (quoting Victoria Slind-Flor, Markman Precedent Holds Up Patents: 
Ruling Intended to Add Predictability and Speed Fails to Do So, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 15, 2001, at A1).  
Professor Moore has since been appointed to the CAFC. 
31 Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Rader, J. dissenting).  
32 Moore, supra note 29, at 239. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 246-47. 
35 Zidel, supra note 27, at 741-42.  
36 Chu, supra note 27, at 1104.   
37 Bender, supra note 27, at 207.  
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¶20 At the point where the rate of reversal is so high, there is scant evidence to 
conclude that district court claim construction orders are in “a state of being free from 
doubt.” 
Interjurisdictional Uniformity2.  
¶21 By enacting a procedural change that applies to all district courts in the United 
States, Markman has created some uniformity.  Although the Court may have created 
certainty in who determines claim construction, there is little additional evidence 
suggesting that patent litigation practice is uniform throughout the district courts.  As a 
result, change is necessary to thwart the evils of forum shopping currently plaguing the 
judicial system.  
¶22 Congress created the CAFC to provide the uniformity necessary to “strengthen the 
United States patent system.”38  After examining the 9,615 patent cases filed between 
1995 and 1999 and the 1,409 patent cases that went to trial between 1983 and 1999, 
Professor Moore concluded that “despite the creation of the Federal Circuit, choice of 
forum continues to play a critical role in the outcome of patent litigation.”39  In discussing 
the normative evils of forum shopping, Professor Moore noted that  
[t]his manipulability of the administration of law thwarts the ideal of 
neutrality in a system whose objective is to create a level playing field for 
resolution of disputes.  The ultimate result is unpredictability and 
inconsistency in the application of the law among the district courts.  This 
instability erodes public confidence in the law and its enforcement and 
creates doubt about the fairness of the system.40
¶23 Moreover, forum shopping creates judicial inefficiencies by clogging preferred 
courts with patent cases and by increasing the costs of litigation by adding administrative 
and economic burdens on the parties.  41
III. THE POSSIBLE TIMING OF CLAIM CONSTRUCTION; THE STATUS OF INTERLOCUTORY 
APPEALS BEFORE THE CAFC 
¶24 District courts have broad discretion to determine the timing of claim construction 
hearings.  Despite this discretion, most courts (and commentators in the field) suggest 
that claim construction should be performed at the end of discovery.  Reliance on 
extrinsic evidence is the likely reason that many courts conduct claim construction after 
discovery.  The Northern District of California and the District of Delaware, however, are 
two districts employing the “rocket docket” system of early discovery claim construction.  
Although courts are free to certify claim construction orders for appeal on an 
interlocutory basis, such orders are very rare and the CAFC has yet to hear such an 
appeal. 
 
38 H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 20 (1981). 
39 Moore, supra note 11, at 892. 
40 Id. at 924. 
41 Id. at 924-25. 
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A. Possible Timings for Claim Construction 
¶25 District courts have broad discretion to decide when to conduct Markman hearings 
and issue orders defining the claim terms at issue.42  Despite this broad discretion, in 
practice, the district courts typically conduct claim construction at one of four time 
periods.43  First, a judge may conduct a claim construction hearing before any discovery 
occurs, presumably shortly after parties exchange the complaint and answer.44  Second, 
the court could hold the hearing at some point during discovery.  Options for in-discovery 
claim construction include, early in discovery, at the conclusion of fact discovery but 
before expert discovery, or after expert discovery.    45
¶26 The Northern District of California and the District of Delaware, where claim 
construction begins soon after parties have exchanged 26(a)(1) disclosures, advocates 
early discovery claim construction, as does this comment.46  A third option for the court 
is to conduct claim construction after the conclusion of all discovery, generally at the 
same time that motions for summary judgment are placed before the court.47  The court’s 
final option is to determine claim construction at trial, typically after the trial has been 
completed but before the judge instructs the jury.   48
¶27 When analyzing its annual Markman Survey, the Intellectual Property Section of 
the American Bar Association repeatedly finds that most courts consider claim 
construction after the close of discovery.49  However such findings must be considered in 
light of the fact that 83% of the district courts surveyed allowed extrinsic evidence to be 
admitted during the Markman hearing.50  The value of extrinsic evidence has thus been 
lessened in the post-Phillips world. 
B. Interlocutory Appeals before the CAFC 
¶28 The CAFC could hear interlocutory appeals since any intermediate district court 
decision may be appealed on an interlocutory basis.51  The CAFC has exclusive 
jurisdiction over “any case over which the court would have jurisdiction of an appeal,” 
 
42 See Vivid Techs. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
43 Mark R. Malek, Markman Exposed: Continuing Problems With Markman Hearings, 7 J. TECH. L. & 
POL’Y 195, 216 (2002). 
44 Id.  
45 William F. Lee & Anita K. Krug, Still Adjusting to Markman: A Prescription for the Timing of Claim 
Construction Hearings, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 55, 82 (1999); Timothy M. Salmon, Comment, Procedural 
Uncertainty in Markman Hearings: When Will the Federal Circuit Show the Way, 18 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL 
COMMENT. 1031, 1038 (2004). 
46 N.D. CAL. PATENT L.R. 2-1.  See Malek, supra note 43, at 219, for a concise summary of the local patent 
rules for the Northern District of California. 
47 Lee & Krug, supra note 45, at 80-81. 
48 Salmon, supra note 45, at 1043-44.  
49 See generally Committee No. 601 – Trial Practice and Procedure: 2002-2003 Annual Report, A.B.A. 
SEC. INTELL. PROP. L. (Brian E. Banner ed., 2003); Committee No. 601 – Trial Practice and Procedure: 
2000-2001 Annual Report, A.B.A. SEC. INTELL. PROP. L. (Mark K. Dickson & James F. Forstner eds., 
2001); Committee No. 601 – Trial Practice and Procedure: 1999-2000 Annual Report, A.B.A. SEC. 
INTELL. PROP. L. (Mark K. Dickson & James F. Forstner eds., 2000). 
50 Committee No. 601 – Trial Practice and Procedure: 1999-2000 Annual Report, A.B.A. SEC. INTELL. 
PROP. L., at 3 (Mark K. Dickson & James F. Forstner eds., 2000). 
51 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2000). 
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including matters of patent infringement.52  To rise to the level necessary to be appealed 
on an interlocutory basis, an issue must meet three requirements.53  First, the issue must 
involve a “controlling question of law.”54  Second, the question of law must be one “as to 
which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion.”55  Third, only those orders 
which “may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation” can be made 
available for interlocutory appeal.   56
¶29 At the point that “[i]t is well recognized that the construction of the claims may 
resolve some or all of the issues of infringement,” it is evident that claim construction is a 
controlling question of law.57  Additionally, claim construction is construed by the district 
court as a matter of law.58  Moreover, “[t]he legislative history of subsection (b) of 
section 1292 . . . indicates that it was to be used only in extraordinary cases where 
decision of an interlocutory appeal might avoid protracted and expensive litigation.”  59
¶30 An order has “substantial ground for difference of opinion” when “the question is 
difficult, novel, and either a question on which there is little precedent or one whose 
correct resolution is not substantially guided by previous decisions.”60  Questions of 
claim construction are certainly difficult, almost always lack precedent, and are rarely, if 
ever, guided by previous decisions.  Also, the frequent reversal of district court claim 
construction orders by the CAFC suggests claim construction gives rise to the necessary 
range of opinion.  61
¶31  Finally, because parties will have significantly more knowledge of their positions 
once claim construction is settled, and may ultimately be induced to settle, interlocutory 
appeals of claim construction can “materially advance the ultimate termination of the 
litigation.”62  Thus, claim construction decisions of the district courts may be appealed to 
the CAFC on an interlocutory basis.   
¶32 Although the option of holding interlocutory appeals is available, the CAFC refuses 
to exercise its discretion and grant interlocutory appeals of claim construction.63  In her 
dissenting opinion in Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc., Judge Newman articulated 
that  
[m]ost of the shortfalls between expectation and reality arise from the 
manner of implementation of our de novo authority for claim 
interpretation . . . .  Although the district courts have extended themselves, 
and so-called ‘Markman hearings’ are common, this has not been 
accompanied by interlocutory review of the trial judge’s claim 
 
52 Id. at § 1292(c). 




57 Vivid Techs. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
58 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 978 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 
(1996). 
59 U.S. Rubber Co. v. Wright, 359 F.2d 784, 785 (9th Cir. 1966). 
60 In re Grand Jury Proceedings June 1991, 767 F. Supp. 222, 225-26 (D. Colo. 1991). 
61 Craig Allen Nard, Intellectual Property Challenges in the Next Century: Process Considerations in the 
Age of Markman and Mantras, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 355, 373-74 (2001). 
62 Id. at 374. 
63 Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs, Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Newman, J. dissenting). 
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interpretation.  The Federal Circuit has thus far declined all such certified 
requests . . . [i]nstead of conducting the expected dispositive de novo 
review, we simply declined the question.   64
¶33 The CAFC has refused to hear interlocutory appeals despite yearnings from the 
district courts.65  Professor Craig Allen Nard has suggested that the CAFC’s reluctance to 
hear interlocutory appeals of claim construction may simply reflect the general trend 
among federal appellate courts to not grant interlocutory appeals that are raised pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).  66
IV. EARLY DISCOVERY CLAIM CONSTRUCTIONS THAT ARE IMMEDIATELY APPEALABLE TO 
THE CAFC ON AN INTERLOCUTORY BASIS – A RIPE PROCEDURAL CHANGE 
 
¶34 In Phillips v. AWH, the CAFC revisited the issue of what types of sources are 
available to the district court when construing claims.  The court noted that there are six 
primary types of sources that courts may use, including the patent claims, specification, 
and prosecution history as well as testimony, dictionaries, and treatises.  Because 
discovery is not required to obtain any of these sources, the Phillips court has effectually 
de-emphasized the necessity for discovery prior to claim construction.  Moreover, such 
early discovery claim construction could be immediately appealed to the CAFC on an 
interlocutory basis, ensuring that certainty is maximized before the parties engage in 
costly discovery proceedings. 
A. Early Discovery Claim Construction 
¶35 At the point that claim construction is a matter of law whose determination is solely 
the province of the court, it is disingenuous to argue that substantial discovery is 
necessary to determine the meaning of claim terms.  Before making the case for early 
discovery claim constructions, it is necessary to review the recent holding of the CAFC in 
Phillips v. AWH. 
1. Phillips v. AWH 
¶36 The CAFC’s most recent examination of the procedural trials and tribulations of 
claim construction occurred in Phillips v. AWH Corp.  In Phillips, the CAFC, sitting en 
banc, reviewed an earlier panel decision upholding a district court finding of 
infringement on “steel-shell panels that can be welded together to form vandalism 
resistant walls.”   The court granted the petition for rehearing “in order to resolve issues 67
 
64 Id. 
65 TM Patents, L.P. v. IBM, 72 F. Supp. 2d 370, 377 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (“[S]o final is a Markman ruling 
that one could make a strong case for routinely certifying an interlocutory appeal to the Federal Circuit . . . .  
Given the frequency with which the Federal Circuit overrules the District Court judges on issues of claim 
interpretation, such appeals would save millions of dollars and thousands of hours of trial time based on 
patent constructions that turn out to be erroneous.”). 
66 Nard, supra note 61, at 372. 
67 Phillips v. AWH Corp. (Phillips II), 415 F.3d 1303, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2005).  
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concerning the construction of patent claims.”68  It certified seven questions for review, 
inviting amicus briefs from all interested parties.  69
¶37 Relevant to this comment is the court’s summary of the utility of certain types of 
evidence in the process of claim construction.  Initially, the court divided cases requiring 
claim construction into two types: those where “the ordinary meaning of claim language 
as understood by a person of skill in the art may be readily apparent even to lay judges” 
and the controversies where “determining the ordinary and customary meaning of the 
claim requires examination of terms that have a particular meaning in a field of art.”70  In 
resolving disputes over the meaning of terms in the first type of cases, the CAFC noted 
that “general purpose dictionaries may be helpful.”71  In the instances of the second type, 
the court discussed the myriad of sources that a court may use to determine the ordinary 
meaning of claim language.72  Courts rely on both intrinsic and extrinsic evidence to aid 
in claim construction.73  Intrinsic evidence includes the patent claims, the specification, 
and the prosecution history.74  Extrinsic evidence is material that is external to the patent 
and includes inventor and expert testimony, general purpose and technical dictionaries, 
and learned treatises.  75
¶38  In attempting to determine claim meaning, the en banc court observed that the 
inquiry begins with the context that the disputed words appear in the claims at issue.76  
Additionally, “[b]ecause claim terms are normally used consistently throughout the 
patent,” courts may also use other patent claims to aid in defining terms that are in 
issue.77  After reviewing the patent claims, the court next examines the patent 
specification.  The court commented that the “importance of the specification . . . derives 
from its statutory role,” specifically, the “statutory requirement that the specification 
describe the claimed invention in ‘full, clear, concise, and exact terms.’”78  Addressing 
the utility of the specification in claim construction, the CAFC previously commented 
that, “[u]sually, it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed 
term.”    79
¶39 The third type of intrinsic evidence that courts may consider is the patent 
prosecution history.80  The file history includes all correspondence between the inventor 
(specifically, the inventor’s attorney) and the patent office, and is a complete record of all 
proceedings including any prior art disclosed to the USPTO.81  Because the “prosecution 
history represents an ongoing negotiation between the PTO and the applicant,” and “lacks 
the clarity of the specification” it is at the bottom of the intrinsic evidence “hierarchy.”  82
 
68 Phillips v. AWH Corp. (Phillips I), 376 F.3d 1382, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
69 Id. at 1383.  
70 Phillips II,  415 F.3d at 1314. 
71 Id. 
72 Id.  
73 Id. at 1313-14. 
74 Id.  
75 Id. at 1317. 
76 Id. at 1314. 
77 Id. at 1314-15. 
78 Id. at 1316 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 1). 
79 Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
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¶40  Consistently, the CAFC has held that extrinsic evidence is “less significant than 
the intrinsic record in determining ‘the legally operative meaning of claim language.’”83  
The first branch of the extrinsic evidence hierarchy yields two types of evidence: the use 
of inventor/ expert testimony and the use of dictionaries and treatises on the subject 
matter at issue.  
The Phillips court observed that expert testimony can be useful to a court 
for a variety of purposes, such as to provide background on the technology 
at issue, to explain how an invention works, to ensure that the court’s 
understanding of the technical aspects of the patent is consistent with that 
of a person of skill in the art, or to establish that a particular term in the 
patent or the prior art has a particular meaning in the pertinent field.   84
¶41 However, the court stated that such testimony should be given little weight when it 
is contrary to the intrinsic evidence.85  Moreover, the CAFC summarized its view that 
“extrinsic evidence in general is less reliable than the patent and its prosecution history in 
determining how to read claim terms . . . .”   86
¶42  General purpose and technical dictionaries as well as learned treatises may also be 
used to determine claim meaning.  Judge Bryson noted that, 87
[b]ecause dictionaries, and especially technical dictionaries, endeavor to 
collect the accepted meanings of terms used in various fields of science 
and technology, those resources have been properly recognized as among 
the many tools than can assist the court . . . .88
¶43 Additionally, the Phillips court abandoned its earlier holding in Texas Digital 
Systems v. Telegenix, which upheld the use of dictionaries as a starting point in 
determining claim meaning.89  It criticized the Texas Digital holding as having “too much 
reliance on extrinsic sources.”90  The CAFC held that a district court may consider any 
particular extrinsic sources “as long as those sources are not used to contradict claim 
meaning that is unambiguous in light of the intrinsic evidence.”    91
 
83 Id. (citing C.R. Bard, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 388 F.3d 858, 862 (Fed. Cir. 2004), quoting 
Vanderlande Indus. Nederland BV v. ITC, 366 F.3d 1311, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). 
84 Id. at 1318. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 1318-19 (“First, extrinsic evidence by definition is not part of the patent and does not have the 
specification's virtue of being created at the time of patent prosecution . . . .  Second . . . extrinsic 
publications may not be written by or for skilled artisans and therefore may not reflect the understanding of 
a skilled artisan in the field of the patent.  Third, extrinsic evidence consisting of expert reports and 
testimony . . . can suffer from bias that is not present in intrinsic evidence . . . .  Fourth, there is a virtually 
unbounded universe of potential extrinsic evidence of some marginal relevance that could be brought to 
bear on any claim construction question. . . .  Finally, undue reliance on extrinsic evidence poses the risk 
that it will be used to change the meaning of claims in derogation of the “indisputable public records 
consisting of the claims, the specification and the prosecution history. . . .”). 
87 Id. at 1318. 
88 Id.  
89 Id. at 1324. 
90 Id. at 1320. 
91 Id. at 1324. 
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¶44  Based on the holding in Phillips, it is possible to conclude that there is a hierarchy 
of evidence that may be used to find the plain meaning of claim terms that are in issue.  
First, courts should look to intrinsic evidence for the plain meaning of the words in 
dispute, particularly the patent claims, the specification, and the prosecution history.  
Second, a court may evaluate extrinsic evidence to the extent this evidence accords with 
the intrinsic evidence. 
Why Phillips is Central to the Timing of Markman Hearings.2.  
¶45 At the point that claim construction is determined by the court as a matter of law, it 
is self-evident that substantial discovery is unnecessary to determine the plain meaning of 
claim terms.  In Phillips, the CAFC discussed six types of intrinsic and extrinsic evidence 
that may be used to determine claim meaning, including the patent claims, specification, 
and prosecution history as well as testimony, dictionaries, and treatises.92  Each of these 
six sources is available to the court regardless of the level of discovery performed by the 
parties.  As such, absent guidance from the CAFC to the contrary, substantial discovery is 
unnecessary to determine claim construction. 
3. Evidence of Early Claim Construction Success – the Special Case of the Northern 
District of California 
¶46 Beginning in 1997 the Northern District of California became the first court to 
enact local rules that govern the disposition of patent cases.93  The local rules begin to 
impact the patent case very early.  At the same time that the parties hold an initial Rule 
26 conference, they must also hold a case management conference.94  During this 
conference, parties must propose modifications to the local rules and decide the order in 
which parties will present, whether live testimony will be offered in the Markman 
hearing, any discovery limits, and the scheduling of the claim construction hearing.  95
¶47 Within ten days of the initial case management conference, the party accusing 
patent infringement must produce a “Disclosure of Asserted Claims and Preliminary 
Infringement Contentions,” (DOA-PIC) including claim charts identifying the asserted 
claims infringed.96  When producing the aforementioned disclosure, the party asserting 
infringement must also produce “[a]ll documents evidencing the conception, reduction to 
practice, design, and development of each claimed invention . . . .”97  Within forty-five 
days of receiving a DOA-PIC, a party opposing a claim of patent infringement must file 
its preliminary invalidity contentions and produce any documents related to such 
counterclaims.98  Ten days after the party opposing accusations of patent infringement 
produces its invalidity contentions, the claim construction process begins with each party 
 
92 Id. 
93 Patent L.R. 1-3 (2001). 
94 Patent L.R. 2-1 (2001).  
95 Id. 
96 Patent L.R. at 3-1. 
97 Patent L.R. at 3-2. 
98 Patent L.R. at 3-3 - 3-4. 
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simultaneously exchanging “a list of claim terms, phrases, or clauses which that party 
contends should be construed by the Court . . . .”   99
¶48 Any necessary context that a court desires when construing claims is provided once 
the documents related to the conception and reduction to practice of the invention are 
produced.  If parties are unable to determine their claim construction position based upon 
the patent, they should certainly be able to after reviewing these documents.  A search for 
journal or review articles criticizing the rules in the Northern District of California 
yielded no results.  In fact, two commentators positing that the “right” time for claim 
construction is after all discovery has been completed, concede that “under these rules, 
[where] the parties must adhere to a variety of mandatory initial disclosures, the 
discovery process is more productive.”100  Just as the Northern District of California 
requires early discovery claim construction, so should all other district courts.  Put 
simply, extensive discovery is not necessary to construe disputed claim terms. 
B. Interlocutory appeals 
¶49 Several others have commented on the utility of making claim construction 
decisions appealable to the CAFC on an interlocutory basis.101  However, none of these 
commentators have suggested the combination of both early discovery claim construction 
and interlocutory appeals.  In weighing in favor of making interlocutory appeals available 
on a discretionary basis, Professor Nard suggests that the Supreme Court can “exercise its 
authority pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act to promulgate a rule specifically making 
Markman orders appealable as a matter of discretion or, in the alternative, appealable as 
of right.”   102
¶50  To advance certainty and to conserve resources amongst both the courts and 
parties subject to patent litigation, district courts should certify interlocutory appeals 
immediately after issuing claim construction orders.  Similarly, the CAFC should accept 
such appeals and evaluate the decisions of the lower court de novo.  Where the CAFC 
finds no reason to disagree with the district court, the panel may simply recertify the 
lower court’s order. 
V. ADVANTAGES OF EARLY DISCOVERY CLAIM CONSTRUCTION COMBINED WITH 
IMMEDIATE APPEALS TO THE CAFC ON AN INTERLOCUTORY BASIS. 
 
¶51 Early discovery claim construction coupled with claim construction orders that are 
immediately appealable to the CAFC on an interlocutory basis achieves numerous 
advantages.  First, setting the timing of claim construction enhances uniformity by 
 
99 Patent L.R. at 4-1. 
100 Lee & Krug, supra note 45, at 79.  
101 See e.g. Nard, supra note 61, at 378; Michael A. O’Shea, A Changing Role for the Markman Hearing: 
In Light of Festo IX, Markman Hearings Could Become M-F-G Hearings Which Are Longer, More 
Complex, and Ripe for Appeal, 37 CREIGHTON L. REV. 843 (2004); George Summerfield & Todd 
Parkhurst, Procedures For Claim Construction After Markman, 20 MISS. C. L. REV. 107, 115-16 (1999); 
Frank M. Gasparo, Note, Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. and its Procedural Shock Wave: The 
Markman Hearing, 5 J.L. & POL'Y 723, 762-63 (1997). 
102 Nard, supra note 61, at 357. 
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solidifying the claim construction schedule in all instances of patent litigation.  Moreover, 
uniformity is enhanced because all district courts operate under the same claim 
construction schedule.  Such scheduling uniformity also discourages forum shopping.  
Professor Kimberly Moore concluded that speed of adjudication is one of many factors 
that results in forum shopping, particularly by patent holders filing infringement suits.103  
Additionally, Parsons et. al noted that the early scheduling conferences in the District of 
Delaware contribute to that district’s status as a patent litigation center.104  Similar 
evidence can be logically inferred in the Northern District of California, where early 
scheduling is the norm. 
¶52  Second, early discovery claim construction combined with interlocutory appeals 
to the CAFC fosters greater certainty at a significantly earlier stage in the litigation.  
Once claim construction is settled by the CAFC, the case is remanded to the district court 
to continue formal discovery, expert reports, summary judgment, etc.  Because claim 
construction is settled before discovery is concluded, the parties are better able to solidify 
their strategic position at an early stage.  
¶53 Third, the proposed solution fosters judicial efficiency in several ways.  Early 
solidification of claim construction encourages the parties to use alternate dispute 
resolution at an early point in the dispute which can induce both sides to settle at an early 
stage.  Also, early claim construction procedures encourage greater due diligence before 
filing suit which may result in more pre-filing settlements while reducing the number of 
patent infringement suits filed.  
¶54 Although early discovery claim construction may significantly increase the cost of 
early stage patent litigation, the onset and growth of contingency patent litigation helps to 
ensure that all parties are given a chance.  Furthermore, Malek indicates that early 
discovery claim construction is the only way “to open the door to the patent litigation 
process” to small, individual inventors who lack wealthy investors.105  Also, this uniform 
solution creates additional efficiency since both the parties and the court need not spend 
time and effort negotiating scheduling of claim construction.  In addition, the resultant 
uniformity in scheduling of claim construction significantly reduces the evils of forum 
shopping.  Finally, early settlement of claim construction reduces future appeals. 
¶55 Fourth, the proposed solution maximizes the accuracy of patent claim construction.  
In the very rare instances that discovery proves that an alternate claim construction 
should have been made, the CAFC can revisit the issue once the judgment of the district 
court is certified.  Because the CAFC is reviewing its earlier determination to see if it was 
clearly erroneous, there is little threat to judicial economy.    
¶56  Though the proposed solution will significantly raise the burden placed upon the 
CAFC, a balancing test reveals that early discovery claim construction decisions which 
are immediately appealable to the CAFC are comparatively more economical than the 
present system.  Critics of the current system of patent litigation contend that the current 
model is too expensive, too wasteful, and results in too much uncertainty.106  At present, a 
party seeking to appeal its claim construction order must either stipulate to infringement, 
or waste significant financial resources of both the judiciary and the parties on a trial 
 
103 Moore, supra note 11, at 908.  
104 Parsons, et al., supra note 11, at 152.   
105 Malek, supra note 43, at 223-24.  
106 O’Shea, supra note 101, at 857. 
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which “rolls the dice.”  Presumably, the claim construction in these cases is generally 
appealed anyway.107  Interlocutory appeals avoid this troublesome situation.  The balance 
also favors the proposed solution since the increased settlement rate will lighten the load 
of the district courts, resulting in enhanced efficiency.  Thus, early discovery claim 
construction that allows for interlocutory appeals to the CAFC yields numerous 
advantages. 
VI. A BRIEF EXAMINATION AND RESPONSE TO THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST EARLY 
DISCOVERY CLAIM CONSTRUCTION COUPLED WITH INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS. 
¶57 No arguments have been made opposing interlocutory appeals to the CAFC.  
However, it is predicted that any argument against such a solution begins with the 
heightened caseload to be faced by the CAFC.  
¶58 Several pre-Phillips commentators have posited that the optimal time for claim 
construction is either after the close of discovery or at the same time that the district court 
decides motions for summary judgment.108  In arguing against early discovery Markman 
hearings these commentators generally advance four arguments.  First, extensive 
discovery allows parties to focus the issues before the judge on the patent claims that are 
at issue, thereby reducing the burden placed upon the district court. 109  Second, allowing 
the judge to participate in discovery aids her in placing herself in the position of the 
PHOSITA.110  Third, substantial discovery is needed to provide factual context to both 
the judge and the parties.111  Fourth, that in the cases where discovery proves that the 
claim construction was incorrect, substantial time is wasted by early Markman.   112
¶59 Each of these arguments generally fails when viewed in the context of Phillips v. 
AWH.  Although early discovery claim construction may result in the construction of 
non-vital claim terms, the amount of time spent on such constructions is minimal when 
compared with the amount of time that can be wasted on unnecessary trials.  Moreover, 
parties may still drop claim terms as the fruits of discovery are ripened.   
¶60 Although judges may prefer the factual context that post-discovery claim 
construction provides, courts can adapt to the proposed schedule.  As courts begin to 
experiment with early discovery claim construction their judicial expertise in claim 
interpretation will be altered to reflect the added time pressures of early discovery claim 
 
107 Nard, supra note 61, at 371. 
108 See e.g. David H. Binney & Toussaint L. Myricks, Patent Claim Interpretation After Markman – How 
Have the Trial Courts Adapted?, 38 IDEA 155, 184 (1997) (stating that “[t]he ideal timing for a Markman 
hearing is probably shortly after the close of discovery”); John R. Lane & Christine A. Pepe, Living Before, 
Through, and With Markman: Claim Construction as a Matter of Law, 1 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 59, 63-
64 (2001) (arguing “determining claim construction before the close of pre-trial discovery may be 
premature”); Lee & Krug, supra note 45, at 86 (concluding that the “right” time for claim construction is 
“after all discovery has been completed, at the time the court considers the parties’ summary judgment 
motions.”); Salmon, supra note 45, at 1031 (citing the advantages of post-discovery Markman hearings 
upon motions for summary judgment); JOHN W. SHAW, MARKMAN HEARINGS – WHEN IS THE BEST TIME? 
(July 31, 2002), http://www.ycst.com/Articles/57_jshaw_markman.pdf. 
109 Binney & Myricks, supra note 108, at 184; Lee & Krug, supra note 45, at 80; Salmon, supra note 45, at 
1041-42; Shaw, supra note 108, at 8-10. 
110 Salmon, supra note 45, at 1042; Shaw, supra note 108, at 12-13. 
111 Binney & Myricks, supra note 108, at 184; Lane & Pepe, supra note 108, at 63; Lee & Krug, supra note 
45, at 84-85; Shaw, supra note 108, at 6-7. 
112 Lee & Krug, supra note 45, at 78; Shaw, supra note 108, at 7-8. 
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construction.  Under the proposed solution, the court may continue to consider the same 
extrinsic evidence that it currently uses to understand the position of the PHOSITA.  
Though the proposed solution may reduce the district court claim construction to little 
more than a rough draft, the nature of patent litigation has necessitated such broad steps.  
The empirical evidence suggests that district court claim construction produces a rough 
draft whether it is appealable on an interlocutory basis or not. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
¶61 Markman brought promises of greater certainty and uniformity in patent claim 
construction.  However, the high rate of reversal of district court claim construction 
orders by the CAFC evidences the uncertainty in claim construction.  Furthermore, the 
prevalence of forum shopping showcases the need for greater uniformity.  Although 
Markman was a good first step, the time has come for additional procedural changes to 
bring about both enhanced certainty and expanded uniformity. 
¶62  To enhance uniformity of claim construction across the federal districts, a uniform 
rule should be adopted requiring early discovery claim construction.  The local patent 
rules of the Northern District of California may be used as guide for such a rule.  In light 
of the recent holding of the CAFC in Phillips v. AWH, district courts must use intrinsic 
evidence as the starting point for all claim constructions.  In early discovery claim 
construction, the court can hear the same evidence that it would hear in post-discovery 
Markman hearings.  The accompanying reduction in forum shopping provides greater 
efficiency to both the parties and the court system. 
¶63 To maximize the certainty of claim construction at the earliest possible time, 
district courts should be encouraged to certify interlocutory appeals of their claim 
construction.  Moreover, the CAFC must begin to accept these appeals.  The resultant 
reduction in the level of uncertainty informs parties of their positions at an early stage 
and can induce parties to settle.   
¶64   The CAFC recently celebrated its twenty-third birthday and the patent 
community will soon celebrate the ten year anniversary of Markman.  The time is ripe for 
the next big step to be taken to bring about greater uniformity in the disposition of patent 
infringement cases. 
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